Russian-Ukrainian Drone War: What's Next
During the "Spiderweb" operation, authored by the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) on June 1, 2025, Ukrainian drones struck 41 Russian strategic aviation aircraft. This was a significant blow to Russia's capabilities but is unlikely to change the intensity of shelling in Ukraine.
Anatolii Khrapchynskyi, an aviation expert and deputy general director of a company manufacturing EW equipment, explained to The Page how the SBU operation will affect further Russian attacks, how realistic predictions are about Russia using 500 "Shaheds" nightly, and where the UAV and EW industries in Ukraine should move.
Russia's Nuclear Triad Without Its Aviation Component
What are the main conclusions of the "Spiderweb" operation for you?
A qualitatively planned asymmetrical war, where you don't need to launch missiles with a range of 2,500 km; a drone that can operate at 15 km is enough. We need to understand the historical significance of this event. The Russians constantly talked about not wanting NATO countries on their border, but within their own country, they could not protect their strategic assets. This shows Russia's weakness; it will not be able to use these aircraft for strikes on European territory.
After every drunk tweet from Medvedev, we expected something like a missile launch on Paris or Berlin. This is not happening because Russia has lost the strategic aviation potential it had. That is, their nuclear triad is unlikely to be able to perform the actions the Russians counted on.
Russian strategic aviation is on fire at one of its airfields." Photo credit: SBU
If we talk specifically about the consequences for attacks on Ukraine, are there any?
The resource of these aircraft has significantly decreased recently. We have seen a reduction in the number of missiles carried by strategic aviation aircraft. Therefore, Russia has significantly ramped up drone and ballistic missile strikes.
I think this will not significantly affect the use of missiles against Ukraine. But it still has strategic importance. According to estimates before the SBU operation, the repair of a Tu-95 or Tu-22M3 could cost up to $100 million.
It is worth understanding that these aircraft were designed for potential entry into a Third World War, to counter the USA, for long-range strikes, up to 3,000-4,000 km.
In the near future, we definitely will not see launches of Kh-101 or Kh-555 class cruise missiles, nor Kh-22 or Kh-32 missiles. But the enemy will continue to try to pressure us with a large number of drones and ballistic missiles.
Perhaps it's worth emphasizing that even before this, cruise missiles were not the main problem for air defense, as many Western systems can shoot them down, unlike ballistic missiles?
Indeed, that's true. Countermeasure systems against cruise missiles, even with complicated maneuvers, when the Russians used tandem missile flights, exist. We could still intercept them at 80-90%. This is quite good, considering such a large quantity.
We are also observing an increase in our strikes on Russian territory. Volodymyr Zelenskyy noted that almost 100 drones are launched at Russian territory nightly, and there could be more. What are the key aspects of these attacks, as we don't often see a media result?
Initially, we forced the Russians to concentrate their strategic aviation at several airfields further from the border. After that, we struck these strategic airfields deep in the rear and at long distances. This speaks to a strategic vision of the situation.
That is, we are playing a chess game that allows us to gain a greater advantage in the future. Let me remind you, out of the seven largest depots of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, four have been destroyed by the Defense Forces of Ukraine. And how many oil enterprises have been hit? So, in principle, if we have the opportunity to actively create a large number of strike deep-strike unmanned aerial vehicles, I think Russia will have a very difficult time every night.
500 "Shaheds" per day: how close is such a reality
Lately, we have seen an unprecedented intensity of Russian air attacks, including a nightly record involving 355 assets. What is the reason for this acceleration, and what goals does the enemy pursue?
First and foremost, it is much cheaper than launching cruise missiles from strategic aviation. Russia still does not have cruise missiles that could be launched from tactical aviation and operate up to 500 km deep. Europeans have the German Taurus, British Storm Shadow, American JASSM.
Russian missiles require the take-off of strategic aviation, which means 5-6 tons of kerosene fuel per hour of aircraft flight – a significant burden. However, 4-5 liters of gasoline can be used for a Shahed, which is a completely different order of magnitude. Of course, a Shahed is much cheaper than a Kh-101 or Kh-555 cruise missile (one Shahed-136, according to the latest data, costs about $50,000, a Kh-101 cruise missile – $13 million, and an Iskander – $3 million). Therefore, Russia seeks to scale up its means of destruction by reducing costs.
Now they are additionally creating other problems with decoy drones or "spoof" drones, for example, the Gerbera – they overload air defence. At the same time, drones have the same effect as cruise missiles when used in large quantities.
Is Russia increasing the pace of Shahed production at the rate The Economist writes about, meaning reaching the use of 500 Shaheds nightly?
It strives for this. But it's impossible to say that there will be 500 Shaheds per day. Their engines are Chinese, and most of the components are either European or American. Therefore, they cannot guarantee the production of exactly 500 units daily. The number will vary, but they will try to move in that direction, because now the main task is to maximally exhaust our air defence for further actions using other means of destruction.
Some of Russia's plans will change; for example, they need to find money and opportunities to restore strategic aviation, or look for other elements that would fulfill the task of the nuclear triad's aviation component.
Therefore, in the near future, there will be a halt in the use of this aviation, even for flights, to scare the borders of other states. They will now more actively promote Banderol and other jet drones. This will slightly disperse their efforts, which is to our advantage.
What is the main trend for Russian drones currently?
It's difficult to say, but if something works for them, they actively start scaling it up. They are actively scaling up FPV drones and fibre-optic drones. For them, it's a war of quantity, not quality. Let's recall the Kometa EW system, to which they add more and more antennas, but do not improve the software level at all. That is, they try to fix everything through quantity.
They also copy qualitatively; reverse engineering works very well, which is one of the keys to their success, but no more. Our solutions are more technological.
At the same time, Air Force Spokesperson Yurii Ihnat noted that modernised Shaheds now fly at an altitude of several kilometres, making them almost unreachable for mobile groups. What could be the solution here?
Indeed, they are now trying to modernise both the tactics of application and the UAVs themselves. This became possible because they implemented some elements that transmit information via tracking, and the enemy understands how to build routes further, which, for example, will be designed for low-altitude flights in certain areas where radar systems operate. In other areas, where mobile fire groups are located, they need to fly at high altitudes to avoid being hit by classic systems – machine guns.
But machine guns remain relevant?
In principle, there should be an echeloned system that provides for the use of EW systems, machine guns, small anti-aircraft missiles, and interceptor drones. Plus, we additionally need to talk about radar detection, acoustic detection, visual detection, and possibly laser weapons. Therefore, there should be a variety of weapons and a comprehensive approach to countering them.
However, when a Stinger missile costs approximately $120,000-$150,000, and a Shahed costs $50,000, it's challenging to counter this with more expensive systems.
The question is where that Shahed will land, you understand? Perhaps we need to earn more to afford more high-tech equipment. That's another question. But in reality, we are incorrectly calculating the consequences.
Because there are Ukrainian lives, residential buildings, which are very difficult to restore. We should probably calculate the ultimate risks rather than how we will counter. But still, let's note that a large number of private companies are already offering their cheaper technological counter-options.
Are fiber-optic drones the new main trend in the war? Has a countermeasure already been found?
There are already solutions from our military. This is more related to kinetic destruction (a regular shot – The Page), but there are also certain developments regarding EW systems that can affect such drones. It needs to be somewhat improved, increasing the capabilities regarding operating distance. And in principle, this will probably be the beginning of the end for fiber-optic drones, because it would still be better to talk about AI-powered drones or real-algorithm drones – that's the most promising, rather than flying on fiber optics.
This was a situational solution that simply closed certain issues for a while, but it does not mean that we should abandon fiber-optic drones. Because in the architecture of a modular weapon system, believe me, attaching fiber optics or a radio channel is entirely possible.
Ministry of Defense should start analyzing army resources
Why do we still have such a "zoo" of different types of drones, and is any unification possible at all?
First – unification is needed, but for that, a strategic vision is required. I would develop a codification principle, like in the USA, where every bolt of a Hummer is codified, but the manufacturing company can be different. Any drone is a frame, engine, control, camera, battery; there are already elements that can be separately codified and assembled into the desired combination before going on a combat mission: with a thermal or daytime camera, for example.
It would be better if we codified these things separately and used them like a constructor set. The same applies to EW systems.
There are cases when an EW system works, but the antenna is damaged, and the military cannot buy it separately because it is legally complicated. We have several products that the military uses in a completely different way, and they have excellent results. Systems that were previously used for equipment protection are now used with directional antennas for shooting down.
What should the Ministry of Defense do to implement this?
There is cooperation, there are discussions, but I would start with creating a high-quality analytical center that would analyze all the weaponry we use. There are certain initiatives regarding such analytics. In addition, the center would provide a clear description of what is actually needed on the frontline, and in what quantity.
This would allow for the formation of a high-quality technical order for new products with a strategic vision for the future. And then, in principle, this would be the tool that could bring about unification, standardization, and other requirements we need.
It would be ideal if we knew where we needed to fly, and there was a robotic line where assembled drones against equipment, personnel, and other targets were located. And in case of a threat, the pilot takes what is needed and operates.