How the Rada Reacts to Corruption Among Deputies – Anastasia Radina
At least 54 deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of this convocation have received suspicions of criminal offenses – that's almost every eighth elected official. Corruption is the most popular suspicion. The largest number of suspicions were received by deputies from "Servant of the People" and the now banned OPZZh.
The Page spoke with Anastasia Radina, head of the Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy in the Verkhovna Rada, deputy from the "Servant of the People" faction, about Ukrainian corruption, the responsibility of people's deputies for it, and the relationship between parliament and the President's Office.
At what stage is the fight against corruption in Ukraine now?
We must honestly admit that the institutional system for combating corruption in our country started working in 2019, when the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) started operating. When we, with one of the first votes in parliament in 2019, adopted amendments to the law that, in fact, allowed the HACC to be fully launched, and not leave it as an institution that would be overwhelmed with minor cases.
Only since then, I consider it correct to fully count the fight against corruption. We have verdicts in cases (in almost six years of work, the HACC has issued more than 200 verdicts – The Page), we have many defendants whose cases are being heard in the anti-corruption court. It seems to me that ten years ago no one would have thought that this fate would still befall them and that some responsibility would come.
At the same time, we cannot talk about 100% effectiveness of these bodies. There are internal reasons, and audits of these bodies confirm them. There are external ones, because despite the existence of a comprehensive anti-corruption infrastructure, there are significant holes that help delay cases. These holes make it possible to close a case if it was submitted to court one day later than the end of the pre-trial investigation period, even regardless of the evidence in the case, and so on.
On May 6, the Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Mathias Cormann, presented a report on the fight against corruption in Ukraine.1 It shows that in some indicators Ukraine has a level that exceeds the average in OECD countries:
- openness in the field of public finances;
- declarations of officials;
- openness of information about the ultimate beneficial ownership.
It is also necessary to recognize that corruption is not a purely Ukrainian phenomenon, it exists in many countries.
How untouchable are the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada
But still, when the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) found signs of unreliable declaration in 34 deputies (18 of them representatives of "Servant of the People"), is there still a difference with other European countries? How do you react to corruption scandals of representatives of your faction?
I don't have any special levers of influence on the faction, I am exactly the same member of the faction with one vote as all the other colleagues.
When one of the members of the committee on anti-corruption policy received a suspicion of corruption, and then at the stage of court proceedings simply fled abroad (Andriy Odarchenko "SN" sentenced to eight years in prison for offering a bribe, but managed to flee abroad, now lives in Hungary – The Page), I reacted exactly within the limits of the powers I have. Namely, I registered a resolution on his exclusion from the committee, which was later supported by parliament.
So, in general, not much has changed here since 2014?
In parliament, the attitude towards anti-corruption bodies and their legislative regulation has changed a lot compared to what we saw in the previous convocation.
For example, at the moment when anti-corruption bodies detained Mr. Odarchenko, the committee itself was considering a bill to increase the staff of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU). The committee supported this decision, and then the parliament.
In the abstract 2016, in such a situation, colleagues not only would not have made a decision to strengthen NABU, they could have in principle left the committee meeting with a bill to liquidate the bureau. Now in parliament this is unacceptable, anti-corruption bodies work, including on people's deputies, it's their job, and parliament still makes decisions aimed at strengthening these bodies.
We have a lot of cases, and there is a feeling that they often don't move. Why is this happening?
Now I can't, frankly, recall any high-profile case specifically on declaration that received a HACC verdict outside of an agreement with the investigation. One colleague went to a verdict by agreement with the investigation, for example, an investigation is ongoing on one of the colleagues (Andriy Klochko "SN" – The Page) on circumstances that may indicate illegal enrichment.
Instead, many cases on, in fact, declaration were closed either at the stage of investigation or were acquittals. Why is this happening?
The statute of limitations for bringing to justice for lying in a declaration is quite short. It's two or three years, depending on the severity of the crime. This is not the time during which anti-corruption bodies and the court manage to hear the whole case and come to a conclusion.
There is also a problem with the shortage of HACC judges, who are forced to hear dozens of cases at the same time, which delays the general consideration of cases.2 I hope this will be corrected soon. I must draw attention to the fact that, as they say, people's deputies are not the only ones. It seems to me that there is no need to talk about the problems with customs and many other areas. The practice of checking declarations in the NAPC also raises questions, when investigative journalists make stories about the possible wealth of SBU employees (declarations of Security Service employees are checked in a closed mode), and there is no reaction from the NAPC.
Or the NAPC conducts an inspection and says: "we checked, and everything is fine, and everything is wonderful." This also, unfortunately, does not add confidence.
Investigative journalists often associate this with the control of the law enforcement vertical by a well-known person in the President's Office.
This is one of the questions that we ask and will ask the NAPC regarding how they prioritize their resources, what results we have from checking declarations, checking officials in areas where there are obviously high corruption risks.
There are already hundreds of articles about who and how controls the law enforcement vertical in Ukraine. Is this exaggerated or not?
We still have problems with the system of appointments to the highest positions in law enforcement agencies. For example, the Prosecutor General is the most politically unprotected position among all prosecutors. He can be dismissed the day after 226 deputies in parliament gather, who for any reason are not satisfied with the work of the Prosecutor General.
Let me remind you that we still have a rule under which the Prosecutor General gives permission to open criminal proceedings against a people's deputy. Is fully politically independent work possible in such a system? It seems to me that far from always. And this is a hole in the legislation that definitely needs attention.
Does the independence of parliament from the President's Office exist
We see that many people are disappointed with the "responsibility" of people's deputies and top officials before the law. Is there enough political responsibility in Ukraine?
The main mechanism for ensuring political responsibility is still elections. And the results of the 2019 elections, for example, showed that it still exists.
Accordingly, I am at least very much looking forward to the post-war parliamentary elections, which will become the main, in principle, almost the only major instrument of political responsibility.
At the same time, Mr. Boyko, against whom at least three cases have been opened, still remains in the Verkhovna Rada. The opposition calls his remnants of the OPZZh a "crutch" of the authorities for voting for necessary bills. Why is this happening?
This is a great question, in particular for law enforcement agencies: how are the cases moving with the investigation of many things for which there are reasonable suspicions of Mr. Boyko's involvement?
I consider it cynical and immoral that people who in every possible way helped the Russians start a big war against Ukraine are still sitting in the parliament hall. At the same time, unfortunately, the Verkhovna Rada does not have the authority, no matter how much we would like, to simply vote for someone to stop being a people's deputy. This simply does not comply with the Constitution. Period. Therefore, legal mechanisms had to work: a people's deputy is deprived of a mandate, in particular, in connection with a guilty verdict of the court.
I have a big question why, for example, the State Bureau of Investigation or the SBU do not demonstrate results in this matter. Moreover, it seems to me that they not only do not demonstrate results, but even the process of moving towards these results.
It is no secret that at this time the Verkhovna Rada does not have any subjectivity in our politics. Are there chances to change this situation in favor of greater accountability of the executive branch to parliament?
Of course, this thesis has a place. At the same time, I am convinced that every deputy chooses the level of their own subjectivity. In particular, this did not prevent me and many other colleagues from calling the Minister of Defense to investigate the reasons for the "eggs for 17" scandal. By the way, a few weeks ago NABU announced suspicions in these cases.
However, as is known from anonymous sources, the then Minister Oleksiy Reznikov assured the president that the prices were different, and the president believed him. They wanted to dismiss Mr. Reznikov only in September 2024, when the impulse came from the Office, although many had questions about his work before that.
At the same time, I believe that it was the parliament together with investigative journalists who were the two subjects who did not allow this particular former minister to hide all this dirt that was happening with purchases under the rug.
Are there questions to the current minister to call him to the hall, especially regarding the activities of the Defense Procurement Agency and the State Operator of the Rear?
The committee under my chairmanship called the minister to give explanations regarding the DPA. Such decisions were also made by the Verkhovna Rada.
And what did the minister say, he did not appear at the meeting despite the call?
I think we should return to the consideration of the bill, which is in parliament, regarding the responsibility of members of the government for non-appearance when parliament decides to call a minister to report.
Do you feel the influence of the President's Office on parliament?
I personally do not receive calls from the President's Office with a request to vote for or against something. There are personnel decisions that, for various reasons, I do not consider it possible to support. I make decisions according to my conscience and inner conviction. And, yes, there are bills for which the faction votes, but for various reasons I do not vote.
Similarly, no one dictates bills to me, so they often do not please certain parties. For example, our bill No. 12374-d on the reform of ARMA is another obligation of Ukraine to the European Union, for the implementation of which we can receive about 300 million euros in aid.3 The leadership of ARMA publicly resists the bill, inventing new reasons every time. And such behavior of an unreformed body is the biggest compliment for me. By the way, Ms. Natalka Tsymots, the presiding G7 ambassador, and Ms. Katarina Mathernova, the EU ambassador to Ukraine, have already spoken out in support of our bill.
Are the opposition and the authorities at odds
Petro Poroshenko states that the authorities are using martial law to build an authoritarian regime, but some deputies of "European Solidarity" use an even stronger word – dictatorship. What do you think about this?
I can answer for my work and the committee I have the honor to chair. In our anti-corruption policy committee, work with the EU is absolutely constructive. For example, from the committee, I personally submitted Ms. Viktoria Syumar, "European Solidarity," to the working groups on the European integration track. Government offices included her in these working groups without any problems. We are proud that we have professional work in the committee, not political games.
You very diplomatically avoided the statement about building a dictatorship.
The choice of political rhetoric is a matter of personal choice for every politician.
Should there be a certain concentration of management powers in a situation of martial law, related to the war? I think the obvious answer is yes.
No matter how unpopular this thesis is now, but it really seems that many people forget that the truce has not come, the war has not ended, and the Muscovites' attacks along the front line have not ended. Accordingly, the need to quickly make military decisions has not disappeared, as has the need to quickly make administrative civilian decisions related to the military situation.
At the same time, specifically in parliament, a discussion must take place. In my opinion, it is taking place. Frankly, it is difficult for me now to recall when there was such a case that, for example, representatives of the "European Solidarity" faction objected in parliament to the adoption of any bill as a basis and as a whole, and their opinion was not taken into account (voting for bills immediately as a basis and as a whole takes place only with the consent of all factions of parliament). The representative of ES freely conducts a live broadcast of VRU sessions on social networks – I don't know if this is possible in dictatorships, colleagues know better.
You make a completely valid argument. But how to determine the line when the concentration of power in one hand or one body becomes excessive and contributes to corruption, given the naturalness of centralization under martial law?
You know, I am simply organically incapable of answering this question briefly, including because I had the honor of graduating from the Faculty of Philosophy.
The Office of Simple Solutions and Results is tempting, but in reality never works.