What are the prospects for the next elections in Ukraine – Yuriy Bohdanov
After a surge in March, the topic of elections has once again receded to its starting position of "until the end of the war." However, political animosity and attempts by various factions to blame each other for various failures are only escalating.
Therefore, The Page decided to speak with Yuriy Bohdanov, who has repeatedly advised Ukrainian politicians and is currently a publicist and expert in strategic communications, about current political games, the main players' preparations for elections, the vicious circle of Ukrainian populism, and criticism of both the government and the opposition.
Who, Why, and How is Preparing for Elections in Ukraine
Petro Poroshenko's interviews turn into stories about his achievements as a politician and volunteer, while Oleksiy Honcharenko pushes the pedal of populism, building regional networks of Honcharenko-centers. In contrast, journalists and observers from the "European Solidarity" side accuse Volodymyr Zelenskyy of preparing for elections due to sanctions against the fifth president and various meetings at the local level. What's happening?
A politician is always preparing for elections. They must always be in a state of readiness, in a state where voting could happen tomorrow.
Let's take a favorite example for many in Ukraine: Great Britain during World War II. There was a national unity government between the two largest parties. And Churchill, a conservative politician, had the Labour leader Attlee as his deputy, but political battles and disputes never ceased. They continued throughout World War II, which is why the Labour party actually won the first post-war elections. This happened in the summer of '45, practically immediately after German bombs and missiles stopped falling on Britain.
78% of Ukrainians as of early May 2025 believe that elections should only be held after the war is completely over. Source: KMIS
But if we talk directly about preparing for the election process, there is none today. No election headquarters are being formed, nor are lists for the Central Election Commission (CEC). According to my data, there was a period, somewhere at the beginning of this year, when there was a firm belief that as soon as Donald Trump became president, he would immediately reconcile the warring parties, there would be a "deal," and we would rush to elections. This illusion persisted until early March.
Now, any serious politician perfectly understands that elections are at least half a year away. And that's if some peace process actually begins.
Why is the topic of elections constantly thrown into the information space?
Because whoever prepares for elections during a war is a bad person – that's the reputation created. Accordingly, the desire to pin election preparations on one's opponent is a very tempting story for any politician. It's beneficial for the government to accuse the opposition of politicization and division. It's beneficial for the opposition to accuse the government of only thinking about power.
It's also a reason to collect money from sponsors, to find people who are willing to pay because "elections are just around the corner." By the way, Yulia Volodymyrivna is the best example here. The hysteria about elections, which was observed from October 2024 to March 2025, was launched by her, essentially leaking insider information to The Economist magazine that elections were planned for May 25 – by the way, where are they? Because Tymoshenko needs to travel around the regions, meet with farmers, businessmen, and say: I have insider information, elections are coming soon, give us your people, lists, give us money, we'll work.
So, Honcharenko-centers, Yulia Tymoshenko's agitational TikToks, and much more – is this just about building personal popularity, nothing more?
Rather, it's about maintaining focus, because politics is very similar to show business. If you don't appear on stage for a long time, you're forgotten. And it's natural for a politician to try to keep the focus on themselves, to remain visible, present in the information field.
According to the latest polls, there are super high-ranking people who haven't even entered politics. If you take the top 3 in the rating, it's conditionally Zelenskyy, Zaluzhnyy, Budanov. If conditional Petro Oleksiyovych, Yulia Volodymyrivna, Oleksiy Honcharenko, and other old politicians don't keep the focus on themselves, don't speak out, don't generate scandals around themselves, they will simply be forgotten.
One must understand that every politician fights for their electoral niche. Potentially, Budanov or Zaluzhnyy represent the conditionally national-patriotic segment, the same one that Petro Poroshenko represents. That is, if the fifth president doesn't generate scandals, investigations, make outrageous statements, and arrange concerts of mad opposition, he will simply be eaten up in the ratings.
Level of trust and distrust in individual politicians as of May 2025. It is worth noting that the poll does not include "rather trust" or "rather distrust" options. Source: KMIS
What Will New Parties Be Like and Who Has Little Chance Already?
Why then are the ratings of various millionaire bloggers measured? Are our career politicians trying to model different situations?
All people who think about elections understand that they will need media locomotives on their lists. There are people who hold money, that is, they are resource-rich. They will need popular individuals who will allow them to convert their resources into political ratings.
The conditional Sternenko can be an attractive locomotive for some nationalist party. By the way, for the same purpose, media-savvy military personnel are measured to check their recognition, their authority, and so on.
Many also talk about a party of military personnel. Should we expect it?
No, that won't happen. Most likely, it's simply impossible because military personnel are also diverse, with different relationships among them; it's a cross-section of society. Therefore, military personnel will be, like in 2014, distributed among the lists of various parties. Conditionally, a military party will be for whoever Zaluzhnyy leads, if he enters politics, or Budanov.
Similarly, a party of volunteers will be a conditional party with Prytula or Chmut. How many volunteers there will be is a separate question.
I think that the closer the coveted "deal," ceasefire, and negotiations are, the more people we will see actively articulating their desire to enter politics.
Do Yuriy Boyko and the pro-Russian segment have a chance of being elected?
They will evolve from pro-Russian to Euroscepticism. That is, they will say that we have nothing to count on from Europe, everyone there is a traitor, we were betrayed during the war, they will talk about political pragmatism. "We must protect ourselves from wars, no matter what war it is" – all of this will be there.
The question here is who will lead this electorate. Unlikely Arestovych, possibly Boyko, a bit of Honcharenko, Tymoshenko, Razumkov. I estimate the maximum of this field to be about 20%. With adjacent fields, it's no more than 40%. However, almost all leaders here have a huge anti-rating and are unlikely to unite.
Do political projects that are designed for a "thinking audience" with real programs have a chance?
We live in a time when such parties have a chance only if they have a very powerful and media-savvy locomotive. That is, when he promises everything to everyone, and behind him there is some constructive, understandable program. This is possible. But I don't see a person yet who is ready to act as a locomotive that will bring a professional team into the government and the Verkhovna Rada.
Even the current super-moderate, adequate British, German parties are forced to make their rhetoric more radical. Simply so as not to give open fascists or ultrarightists power. Today, a party that goes to elections with moderate rhetoric is doomed to defeat.
I don't see any mechanics, I don't see in sociology anywhere in the world right now that moderates are coming to power, because society understands that moderates are needed.
Why do we constantly step on the rake of populism
Poster for the series "Servant of the People" with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in English. For many abroad, this series is the first about Ukraine.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy was neither ultra-right nor ultra-left; he was not ideologically charged at all. Yet he came to power on populism. The winners before him were similar. Are we doomed to wander the labyrinths of simple solutions, or is there a way out of here?
Look, populism is a political method, nothing more. The question is how you apply political methods and for what purpose. Fortunately for us, xenophobic or conspiratorial populism is not in demand in Ukraine yet.
I think that it's simply impossible to break out of this cycle until we start separating public service and politics. Because politicians always offer simple, quick solutions, especially now, in the digital age, when we communicate in ever shorter messages. The point is that the implementation of "glorious" policies is always a matter of public service, long-term policies. This is the very institutional value that must exist in any country.
That is, when a politician says that in five years we will have a million tanks, someone has to sit in the Ministry of Defense, outline the program, and say: okay, there won't be a million, but there will be 10 thousand. And from government to government, from president to president, this story must be implemented.
Today there is no antidote to this. This "banality" has engulfed the whole world, and the desire for simple solutions is all-encompassing, because the more complex the world becomes, the harder it is for people to come to terms with it.
Therefore, the only way is to involve people as widely as possible in political decision-making. Only broader involvement of society in decision-making, in everyday politics, can develop immunity from the readiness to vote for a tenfold increase in living standards in the next two years. This means: voting more often, making decisions, attending rallies, joining public organizations, actively participating in the work of homeowners' associations.
People think they understand politics, football, or something else, but they haven't played football or engaged in politics. Only everyday participation, local self-government, one's own home, regular referendums, and much more can long-term form a trend towards a more mature attitude towards politics.
It seems that in Ukraine there is still no significant support for promoting free markets; people buy socialist ideas and populist "justice." Is this a matter of education, party platforms, or the Soviet past?
Our small and medium-sized businesses are people who, for the most part, don't want to engage in politics. As long as business in the broad sense isn't ready to support parties, pay politicians, and order certain services from them, this demand will always be secondary.
Our business sometimes starts thinking about this. We had several meetings with people who tried to get advice from me or my colleagues on how to integrate into politics, but often it boils down to solving their own problems. And to form a demand for a reboot and the creation of new systemic rules – the community hasn't reached that stage yet. So when Ukrainian business forms as a community, grows to this point, there will be fundamental changes. Until then, I don't think political programs will fundamentally change.
Because a politician, if they want to be elected, will focus on electoral potential and resources. If resources are given to them by oligarchs or someone not interested in new rules, of course, the slogans will be populist.
What to criticize the government for in 2025
Heads of Ukrainian diplomacy and the core of our delegations during conversations with partners and Russians led by Volodymyr Zelenskyy on May 19. Photo: Andriy Yermak
For many years you have been a critic of both the government and the opposition. What should these two camps be criticized for now?
In my opinion, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his chief of staff Andriy Yermak are indeed successfully managing issues of war and diplomacy; they manage to skillfully maneuver among the mad.
But their domestic policy track is completely failed. They have taken on too many powers, concentrated them in the President's Office, and either delegated problems to their people or ignored them altogether. At the same time, many of them could have been solved simply by increasing the subjectivity of the Cabinet of Ministers and Parliament. This is my main complaint about the government.
There are questions about economic policy, the activities of law enforcement agencies, because they have in some places gone out of control. For example, when heroic SBU fighters are fighting on the front, unheroic SBU fighters are breaking down business doors. The same applies to the DBR and many other agencies. That is, it's not some evil intent, it's a loss of control or an unwillingness to deal with it because there are more important problems.
My main complaint about the opposition, specifically about "European Solidarity," is that they don't help the Verkhovna Rada solve this at all. They work for maximum division, declaring themselves the sole bearer of truth.
I have heard from many "Servants of the People" that they are dissatisfied with the fact that parliament is not considered a subject. But when they sought understanding with the opposition to jointly pressure the Office to treat parliament better, "European Solidarity" responded in the style of: "Oh, the nobodies have come to me," let's be leaders now, and you will follow us.
That is, they call for a government of national unity, but their style of human communication, even with neutrals, is unacceptable. Because if you don't support them, then you are an enemy.
How can this be done from a third, neutral position?
I believe that now the key issue is the external contour: war and diplomacy. Because everything else can be fixed if there is a country.
From a neutral position, if you do not belong to the opposition or to the ruling structures, the main task is to try to remain constructive in the context of promoting the right solutions. If we see progress with European integration, military issues, legislative matters, we need to support them.
We need to curb the desires and appetites of Getmantsev (head of the Verkhovna Rada's financial committee. – The Page), who constantly tries to get into Ukrainians' wallets, not in the format of "we really need money" for defense, but in the format of "I just want you to be uncomfortable."
The opposition should be criticized for "cringeworthy" moments, when Petro Oleksiyovych writes on Telegram that Telegram should be banned. I think this should be paid attention to. You know, you can't despise your voter, even if you think they are stupid. Writing on Telegram "let's ban Telegram" – well, that's not very good.
When a truce comes, we will still be able to concentrate on domestic politics, reboot the Rada, and then the discussion between the government and the opposition will take on more civilized and understandable forms.